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Detch: Bastardy--Common Law Marriage--What Constitutes
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

found in the

STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER IL' "The purpose of the
bill of exceptions is to exhibit on the record the supposed mistakes of the trial court which do not appear on the record and
could not otherwise be brought before the appellate court for review or correction if erroneous.' '2
Where no objection is made when the trial judge absents himself from the courtroom during a civil trial, courts are not in
accord as to the effect of such absence but are unanimous in holding that it is the duty of the judge to be present at all phases of
the trial.' If no objection be raised because of the trial judge
being absent, it is presumed he is absent by consent of parties
litigant.' Hence, they may be said to have waived the right to
have the arguments certified to the appellate court.'
While the instant case was reversed because of excessiveness
of the verdict, it is to be observed that the adjudication that
affidavits of counsel are not a part of the record is not dicta. In
view of decisions in other jurisdictions, the present adjudication in
accord, and the reason and logic found in an analysis of the situation, the law on the point is undoubtedly settled.
-STANLEY E. DADISmAN.

BASTARDY -

COMMON LAW MARRIAGE -

WHAT CONSTITUTES.

- Seeking to be declared the heirs of one K the petitioners
averred that F agreed with K to be man and wife; that she moved
with her parents and family into the home of K and lived there
for seven years bearing two children, the petitioners; that F with
K's consent moved to an adjoining farm owned by K; that the
father visited them regularly; that after two years they moved
2'13 EDW. I, e. 31 (1285), cited in Dryden v. Swinburne, 20 W. Va. 89, 108
(1882).
2Hinton Milling Co. v. New River Milling Co., supra n. 5, at 320; Penix
v. Grafton, 86 W. Va. 278, 100 S. E. 106 (1920).
0 Peters Branch of International Shoe Co. v. Blake, 74 Okla. 97, 176 Pac.
892, 895 (1918).
"Allen v. Ames College Ry. Co., 106 Iowa 602, 76 N. W. 848 (1898);
Gorman v. Sioux City Stockyards, 118 Iowa 749, 92 N. W. 698 (1902).
nHorne v. Rogers, 110 Ga. 362, 35 S. E. 715 (1900); State v. Hammer,
116 Iowa 284, 287, 89 N. W. 1083 (1902) (dicta); Smith v. Sherwood, 95
Wis. 558, 70 N. W. 682 (1897). Contra: Brownlee v. Hewitt, 1 Mo. App.
360, 368 (1876); O'Brien v. People, 17 Colo. 561, 31 Pae. 230 (1892). But
see dissent in State v. Carnagy, 106 Iowa 483, 76 N. W. 805 (1898), where
at page 491 arguments against reversal where the judge was absent are
presented. See also cases cited in 17 Am. AND ENG. ENCY. oF LAw (2d ed.
1900) 720.
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back to the K home and lived there for four more years during
which time was born a third child which died and that K paid
the expenses attendant upon the birth and burial of the child;
that the relationship continued for twenty-one years at the end
of which time F and K mutually agreed to discontinue their
marital relationship. It was alleged that F upon the advice of
her father retained her maiden name for herself and her children
because she was not formally married by a preacher; that K always recognized petitioners as his sons and taught them to call
him "daddy". Defendants demurred. Held: The pleadings were
insufficient; they must be construed strictly. Fout v. Hatlin.1
In West Virginia a common law marriage is not valid,' but
issue of. such a marriage are legitimate by statute' which is construed liberally.' The purpose of the statute is to prevent the
penalizing of innocent children for the sins of their parents.'
From a continuous cohabitation and reputation may be inferred something more than a protracted liaison or an arrangement of convenience.' Cohabitation and reputation establish a
presumption of marriage where there is no proof of an actual
marriage.' The agreement of the marriage may be implied from
the acts and conduct of the parties. They need not live together
continually' and it has been held that cohabitation for nine years
with an interval during this period, with birth of two children, is
sufficient to establish a valid common law marriage regardless of
the ceremonial marriage attempted,"0 and if from this relationship
there are children born the presumption of marriage and legitimacy
applies with peculiar force.' Paying of expenses attendant upon
-169 S. E. 743 (W. Va. 1933).
1Kester v. Kester, 106 W. Va. 615, 146 S. E. 625 (1929). VA. REV. CODE,
c. 48, art. 2, § 1 provides what marriages shall be null and void from the
time of inception, but common law marriages are nowhere mentioned; c. 42,
art. 1, § 7 provides that "the issue of marriages deemed null in law or
dissolved by a court shall nevertheless be legitimate."
Since common law
marriages are not included in the specifications of marriages null in law
it is arguable that they are not within the meaning of the legitimizing statute.
The argument was rejected in the principal case. The court relied on the
Kester case wherein it was decided without reference to this argument that
this section applied to common law marriages.
8W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 42, art. 1, § 7.
1'Kester v. Kester, supra n. 2.
Stones v. Keeling, 5 Call. (9 Va.) 143 (1804).
Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U. S. 423, 27 S. Ct. 563 (1907).
People v. Spencer, 199 Mich. 395, 165 N. W. 921 (1917).
'Adger v. Ackerman, 115 Fed. 124 (C. C. A. 8th 1902).
'Reifschneider v. Reifschneider, 241 Ill. 92, 89 N. E. 255 (1909).
"Sprung v. Morton, 182 Fed. 330 (E. D. Va. 1909).
'Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129 (1884).
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the birth of a child is strong evidence of marriage and nothing
less than positive proof may impugn the validity of the relation.'
These presumptions the court did not consider.
The retention of her maiden name by F because she thought
a church wedding was necessary is not inconsistent with the alleged agreement. If the consent was consummated by the cohabitation and reputation the marriage status existed without
regard to what the parties believed to be the legal effect of their
agreement' and if the general reputation existed the law will
create a common law marriage even though one of the parties
purposely avoided the marriage ceremonial,' or even though both
parties believe a ceremony is requisite to a marriage."5 Then the
common law marriage existed before the petitioners were born
and the retention of the maiden name may have been an afterthought which should not have been controlling and which could
not invalidate the marriage which was prior in time. The
capacity to inherit exists when the child is yet in the womb1' and
a subsequent failure of a third party to give to the child the
proper appellation should not be determinative.
-JOHBN

CRnnuAL LAW

-

L.

DETCH.

JuDIcIAL COMMENT CONSTITUTING PRJUTDI-

Appellant was convicted of violating the Federal
Narcotic Drug Act. His conviction was affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals. On a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
appellant sought a reversal on the grounds. that the instruction
of the trial court calling the jury's attention to the fact that the
defendant had wiped his hands while giving testimony and stating that such mannerism was an indication of lying, was error.
Held, that the instruction was prejudicial. Judgment reversed.
Quercia v. United States.'
In the federal courts trial by jury according to the purest
OlAL ERROR. -

"Adger v. Ackerman, supra n. 8.
23McClurkin v. McClurkin, 206 Ala. 513, 90 So. 917 (1921).
"Severance v. Severance, 197 Mich. 327, 163 N. W. 924 (1917).
GRichard v. Brehm, 73 Pa. 140 (1873).
10W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 42, art. 1, § 8.
153

S. Ct. 698 (1933).
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